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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UN](#) [CD](#) [ER](#)
SUBJECT: DARFUR PARTNER'S MEETING: LITTLE GOOD NEWS

REF: KHARTOUM 02616

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Darfur Partners exchanged notes and ideas on addressing the issues of Darfur with few solid recommendations during a November 2 meeting hosted by the UK Charge. The UN representative assured the group of a seamless leadership transition with the departure of UN Secretary General's Special Representative (UNSGSR) Pronk.

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UK and Dutch representatives professed an increase in Government flexibility on UN support to AMIS. Partners are solidly behind the Gang of Five efforts to engage and move non-signatories towards joining the DPA. Partners also agree in principle to take on a non-paper concerning the dynamics of the Darfur situation, which all agreed required an additional regional approach.

¶2. (SBU) The agenda included a review of the current Darfur security situation, the impact of UNSRSG Pronk's departure, the status of bilateral UNSCR 1706 efforts, updates on Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation progress and non-signatory engagement from the Gang of Five, and discussions on countering spoilers. End Summary.

Unpredictable Security Environment

¶3. (SBU) The UK Defense Attache provided a brief overview of his four security themes in Darfur. Fighting in the north continues to be episodic and localized, with sporadic but ineffective SAF bombing. The areas of Muhajiria and Geraida are still tense, with occasional fighting between SLA-Minawi and JEM forces. JEM elements of the Free Will declarants reportedly have initiated the fighting after coming to an agreement with the Government. Minawi indicated that he would move his forces if AMIS would increase its presence and protect the local population.

¶4. (SBU) Growing disquiet of Arab militias has created a backlash against the Government, but Arab militias still respond to Government direction as indicated by the militia attack on eight villages on October 29 and 30 in the vicinity of Jebel Moon. Partners encouraged the international community to condemn these attacks and press the Government for the disarmament, demobilization, and disbandment of the attackers in accordance with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) security provisions. Finally, support for opposing rebel forces between Chad and Sudan continues to be a significant element of destabilization on both sides of the border.

¶5. (C) The UN political officer indicated that UNMIS did not expect any transition issues with the departure of UNSGSR Pronk. The Government had provided permission for him to return to pack his personal effects. Taye Brook-Zerihoun, as acting Special Representative, has full authority for UNMIS decision-making. Government obstruction and harassment continued at the same pace. The UK Charge noted the impact of the simultaneous absence of special representatives by both the UN and the AU.

¶6. (C) UN support to AMIS is ongoing, with all pledged UN assets already in Sudan shifted to El Fasher, including nine civ-pol and nine military officers. The UN-AU terms of reference (TOR) gained approval, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the UN and the Government for the UN light support package is in the final stages of approval, and the UN has acquired appropriate land in El Fasher for its facilities. The Government is drafting a tripartite MOU for the light support package, which the UN will continue to reject in principle; the UN maintains its understanding that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) includes the UN in all of Sudan.

¶7. (C) All partners acknowledged that a quiet diplomatic effort for UNSCR 1706 continued. The UK indicated that during Hillary Benn's recent visit, Presidential Advisor and GNU lead DPA negotiator Maghzoub al-Khalifa appeared smugly satisfied with the Government's present success, but acknowledged that the UN had an important role in DPA implementation. He welcomed an open-ended, up to two-year, UN support of AMIS, implicitly recognizing that AMIS cannot do the mission by itself. He indicated that the Government preferred African troops, but was willing to accept

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non-African Islamic troop contributions. Maghzoub agreed that UN support was needed in the headquarters, with respect to mobility and logistics, as well as in political dimensions. His redlines were that UN support could not culminate in a transition to a UN PKO and that Sudan would not accept a UN command and control role. The Dutch confirmed that this line was also taken by MFA Lam Akol during the Dutch foreign minister's recent visit. The EU representative stated that after the China-African summit Lam Akol would stop in South Korea to talk to the new UNSG designee; Pol/Econ Chief noted he would continue onto Japan to discuss peacekeeping issues.

Partners Support Nascent DDDC and Engagement Efforts

¶8. (C) The EU representative also provided a readout of the October 18 AU-chaired preparatory meeting on the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process. He indicated that AU PSC Commissioner Djinnit and the DDDC Preparatory Committee Chair Abdul Mohamad would arrive November 4 or 5. The attendees agreed that the DDDC Preparatory Committee would include three seats each for the present signatories (Government and SLM-M); the international partners (League of Arab States, UN, and EU) and the signatories of the Addis Ababa Declaration of Commitment (SLM-Free Will and JEM Peace Wing) one each; tribal leaders and civil society representatives six each; and the remaining two seats for the AU Chairperson and Deputy. The selection of the tribal leaders and civil society representatives will be a difficult task presently assigned to the AU, UN, EU, and LAS representatives in consultation with the DPA signatories. However, the Government has not approved these decisions formally.

¶9. (C) The Embassy's Senior Security Advisor briefed the group on the status of international partners, efforts to

support a non-signatory commanders, conference (reftel). The UK, US, and German representatives voiced concern over the proposed Asmara conference and surmised that the Sudan Government's intent was more likely to confuse and obstruct other efforts to instigate a conference. The UK Charge suggested that those partners who concurred may have better leverage to counter the Asmara conference through the AU, which was not presently engaged in the Asmara effort, than with the Governments of Sudan and Eritrea.

Development of Darfur Dynamics Non-Paper

¶10. (C) Partners discussed how to tackle the issue of Chad and how to deal with the eventual issue of dealing with a last non-signatory holdout. The group agreed the regional aspects of Darfur needed a good &brainstorming8 session. The UK Charge suggested that the group draft a non-paper on the dynamics of Darfur and how to broaden support for the DPA. The partners agreed in principle with the idea, but deferred commitment pending consultations with capitals.

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